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Comparison of Certain Variables in the Large Truck Crash Causation Study With 
Variables Coded in a Review of the Trucks Involved In Fatal Accidents Case Materials 
1 Introduction 
The Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) is the largest and most ambitious effort to 
date to collect data on medium and heavy truck crashes. The purpose of the LTCCS is to identify 
and understand the factors that contribute to truck crashes in order to develop crash 
countermeasures that will be effective in reducing the number and severity of truck crashes. The 
LTCCS was conceived by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and 
conducted in cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
employing NHTSA crash investigators and using a sampling frame developed by NHTSA for its 
own crash databases.  
Certain LTCCS variables are central to the LTCCS methodology. These variables capture the 
critical event, the reason for the critical event, the crash type, pre-event maneuver, avoidance 
maneuver, and right of way for each vehicle. In addition, a set of associated factors was 
collected, identifying conditions that may be correlated with increased crash risk.  
The LTCCS project utilized extensive resources to collect an unprecedented amount of 
information about each crash. The study was conducted over three years, and involved 
investigation teams at 24 locations around the country. Each crash was investigated by an 
experienced crash investigator and an experienced truck inspector, who was responsible for 
performing the post-crash truck inspection. Each case underwent multiple reviews and additional 
information—the assessments that are the subject of this review—was coded at a central 
location. The materials collected include the in-depth investigation, truck inspections, on-site 
investigation including photographs and crash diagrams, access to relevant administrative files 
such as driver history files and carrier records, and the ability to conduct interviews with 
participants, all directed specifically toward establishing the details of the crash event. 
The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute’s (UMTRI) Trucks Involved in 
Fatal Accidents project, in contrast, is a telephone survey of all medium and heavy trucks 
involved in a fatal crash in the United States. Data collected include a detailed description of the 
truck and its cargo at the time of the crash, the type of company operating the vehicle, the type of 
trip the truck was on, how many hours the driver had been at the wheel at the time of the crash, 
and some details about the truck’s role in the crash. Police reports are acquired on all crashes and 
are used to contact the owner, driver, or any other person with knowledge about the crash and the 
truck at the time of the crash. The TIFA survey collects the crash type, structured in the same 
way as the crash type variable in the LTCCS, but none of the other LTCCS variables that 
describe the crash are determined as part of the survey. 
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However, since police reports are acquired from the states for each crash, UMTRI has access to 
all the information contained on the police reports, which often includes details about the crash 
beyond what is captured in the crash type variable. Almost all police reports include crash 
diagrams and a narrative of the events. Some also include witness statements, statements from 
the participants, and even crash reconstructions and vehicle inspections in a few cases. 
The purpose of the present project is to use the materials collected as part of the TIFA survey to 
determine if it is feasible to collect some of the variables about crash events that are part of the 
LTCCS data. The variables collected include pre-crash maneuver, critical event, critical reason, 
crash avoidance maneuver, and right of way. The method is to identify the fatal LTCCS crashes 
in the TIFA data, and independently code the variables for those cases. We then compare the 
results with the results from the LTCCS team to determine how accurately the data can be 
collected using only the information available from the TIFA survey. 
2 Matching TIFA and LTCCS cases 
The first step in the process is to identify the relevant fatal crashes in the TIFA file. We used all 
crashes determined by the LTCCS researcher to include a fatality. There were 261 such cases 
with nonzero weights, i.e., that were sampled after the pilot phase of the LTCCS. These 261 
were the initial target in the TIFA data. 
Since there are no case identifiers in common between the TIFA and LTCCS files, it was 
necessary to develop an algorithm to match the LTCCS cases in the TIFA files. To do this, we 
identified variables in common that established the location of the crash, the time of the crash, 
and that would identify specific vehicles and drivers within a crash.  
The LTCCS data has been “sanitized” to prevent identification of specific vehicles in specific 
crashes, but that is precisely what was necessary to match cases with the corresponding records 
in TIFA. Both location and time are masked in LTCCS. The locations of the primary sampling 
units (PSU) are not publicly released, but knowing those locations is necessary to determine the 
county of the crash. The day of the crash is also censored by setting all crash days to the first day 
of the month in which the crash occurred. NHTSA very kindly provided the locations of the 
PSUs and the exact dates of the crash. In addition to state, county, and crash date, we used the 
hour and minute to identify the crash in time and space. To identify specific vehicles within the 
crash, we used vehicle descriptors such as make, model year, and vehicle identification number 
(VIN), and for the driver, date of birth or age at the time of the crash. 
Matching was done using computer algorithms. Cases that were not matched using the 
algorithms were matched by hand. Hand-matching involves dumping all the records that occur in 
a state on a particular day and searching for the crash and vehicle by identifying cases that might 
plausibly match but escape the computer match. For example, the crash may have occurred in a 
neighboring county, or the age may vary by a year, or the VIN may have a typographical error. 
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The result of the match effort was to identify 245 of the 261 LTCCS cases in the TIFA data. This 
left 16 unmatched cases. 
We then searched the “parent” FARS file. Nominally all trucks in FARS should be in the TIFA 
file, and in fact TIFA includes some trucks that are not identified as trucks in FARS. The TIFA 
protocol searches the FARS file to identify cases that are inconsistently coded in FARS (e.g., a 
gross vehicle weight rating over 10,000 pounds, but identified as a light vehicle) to identify 
trucks. But it is possible that the vehicle is identified in such a way that it is not caught by the 
TIFA filter. Accordingly, for each of the 16 unmatched cases, we examined by hand all of the 
possible cases in FARS. For example, we examined all of the fatal crashes occurring on a given 
date in the state. Of the 16 unmatched cases, we could not find ten at all in FARS. There was no  
crash that occurred on the LTCCS crash date that plausibly match. Of the remaining six, the 
crash was in FARS, but either the LTCCS vehicle was not included or it could not be determined 
if the LTCCS vehicle was included. In either event—in fact for all of the 16—the relevant record 
was not in TIFA, so we did not have any of the TIFA materials (primarily police report) to 
review and code. 
3 Assessment Method 
With the 245 matched TIFA cases in hand, a data collection method was developed using 
Microsoft Access. Figure 1 shows a screen-shot of the interface. Data collected included pre-
crash maneuver, critical event, critical reason, right of way, crash type, and a set of factors coded 
if present. In addition, there was a comment field to record any observations about the crash to 
clarify the coders reasoning for the assessments. 
There were two independent reviewers for each case. The reviewers both have long experience 
in examining police reports, and coding supplemental data. The reviewers include the present 
writer, who has been involved in the LTCCS from near the beginning. He has over 20 years of 
experience in dealing with crash data; helped develop the coding scheme for the LTCCS, served 
on an LTCCS review committee, and has applied similar schemes for other projects. The second 
reviewer, Robert Pichler, also has extensive experience in reviewing police reports and coding 
crash events. He coded similar information for the Michigan Fatal Accident Complaint Team 
(FACT) project. The FACT project captured many variables that also are in the LTCCS, 
including right of way, sequence of events, crash type, and critical event, for a set of fatal truck 
crashes in Michigan. The crash type and critical event variables were modeled on the variables in 
NASS GES and CDS programs, from which the LTCCS variables were taken. Bob has also 
coded similar information from police reports for other projects. 
After each reviewer completed all cases, the results for each case were compared to identify 
inconsistencies in coding between the two reviewers. For each case in which differences were 
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identified, the two reviewers discussed and reconciled the differences. This procedure ensures 
inter-coder reliability and reduces the probability of coding errors. 
 
Figure 1 Data-collection Interface 
4 Limitations of the method 
The information available for the review of TIFA materials is limited primarily to police reports 
only, or in some cases, supplemental information such as post-crash truck inspections and crash 
reconstructions that the state may have supplied when sending UMTRI the police report. Most 
states do not include crash reconstructions—California often includes reconstructions, but most 
states do not. The usefulness of police reports for the purpose of coding critical event and critical 
reason data varies from state to state. For example, police reports in large metropolitan areas can 
be less detailed than those completed by officers primarily focused on traffic safety. The LTCCS 
protocol included an investigator on-site, who could conduct interviews with all parties, and 
examine physical evidence at the scene, as well as the police report. In addition, all trucks 
involved were subject to a Level 1 inspection. 
The TIFA survey as currently structured is focused on the vehicle, company, trip, and driver 
hours driving. In coding critical event and critical reason, the UMTRI reviewers were limited to 
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the information available from a survey not explicitly focused on identifying the critical event in 
the crash or the critical reason for that event. In this way, the present comparison is a 
retrospective study, or a meta-study. It is possible that the outcome would be different if the 
pertinent questions were available at the time of the survey, rather than collected after the fact. 
Of course, the scale of resources available for the LTCCS and the TIFA projects are radically 
different. 
Finally, UMTRI is dependent on the states to send police reports. In each data year, typically one 
or two states fails to supply the reports. The states vary from year to year, though one state does 
not as a matter of state policy. Unfortunately, two of the LTCCS PSUs were located in two states 
that, for periods during the LTCCS, failed to supply police reports to UMTRI. There were 
thirteen matched LTCCS cases for which UMTRI did not receive a police report. Accordingly, 
these thirteen cases could not be coded. 
5 Results 
The following sections present the results of the attempt to code certain LTCCS variables using 
only the materials available in the TIFA survey. First, we present the overall results and 
distributions, comparing them with the corresponding variables in the LTCCS. In the next 
section, the results are compared on a case by case basis, to identify instances where the results 
of the TIFA review conflicted with the LTCCS team’s determination.  Then we describe the 
results of the attempt to identify the presence of selected driver, vehicle, and environmental 
factors. Finally, we compare the information on the critical event and critical reason variables 
with the driver-related and vehicle-related factors variables in FARS. 
5.1 Comparison of distributions 
This section will provide results of comparison of overall distributions for the most important 
variables. A later section will provide results of the case-by-case comparison. Comparison of the 
overall distributions gives a top-level comparison of the results of the two different approaches. 
The comparison at the case level can show whether a difference in the type and depth of research 
materials available can make a difference, not just in terms of details but also whether the 
additional details might actually make a fundamental difference in the evaluation of a case, e.g., 
change a critical reason from a driver to a vehicle factor, or even change the vehicle assigned the 
critical reason. 
We begin with critical reason because the variable is central to the approach of the LTCCS in 
evaluating the contribution to crashes. In the LTCCS methodology, adopted by the UMTRI team, 
the critical reason is coded to the vehicle whose movement immediately precipitated the crash. 
Critical reasons can be coded to driver actions or failure, vehicle failures, or highway/weather 
conditions. Where another vehicle in the collision precipitated the crash, critical reason was 
assigned “not coded to this vehicle.”  
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Table 1 shows the distribution of critical reason category for both the UMTRI review and the 
LTCCS coding.1 The table compares the distribution of codes assigned by the UMTRI review 
team and the LTCCS team. For each team, the number of cases and the percentage of the total 
for each critical reason category is shown. The UMTRI team had a significantly larger number of 
cases left unknown than the LTCCS team. The larger number of unknowns for the review of 
LTCCS cases using TIFA materials is primarily due to the much greater resources employed in 
the LTCCS study. The table also includes a column that adjusts for the high number of 
unknowns in the TIFA review, by excluding them from the calculation of percentages. 
Table 1 Critical Reason Category as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
Review LTCCS 
Critical reason category N % 
% 
excluding 
unknown N % 
Not coded to this vehicle 150 61.2 69.8 166 67.8 
Driver factors 
 Non-performance 4 1.6 1.9 7 2.9 
 Recognition 9 3.7 4.2 23 9.4 
 Decision 7 2.9 3.3 19 7.8 
 Performance 1 0.4 0.5 4 1.6 
 Driver factor, unk. type 35 14.3 16.3 10 4.1 
Vehicle factor 7 2.9 3.3 10 4.1 
Highway/weather factor 2 0.8 0.9 3 1.2 
Unknown 30 12.2 3 1.2 
Total 245 100.0 100.0 245 100.0 
 
Overall, the distribution of critical reason category is reasonably similar. The percentage of cases 
“not coded to this vehicle” is almost the same between the two files. Similarly, both teams coded 
a similar, low percentage of cases in which the critical reason was coded to a vehicle factor or a 
highway/weather (environmental) factor. There are large differences in the details of the driver 
reason. In the critical reason variable, four general categories are defined: Non-performance 
(asleep or other incapacitation); recognition (e.g., distraction or looked but failed to see); 
decision (e.g., misjudgment of gap or too fast for conditions); and performance (e.g., 
overcompensation or freezing). Often the review team, using only the materials available from 
the TIFA file, primarily the police report and associated materials, was unable to distinguish a 
recognition error from a decision error. There simply was not enough information, for example, 
                                                     
1 Coding of critical reason category in the LTCCS required some correction before comparing with the TIFA review 
data. In the LTCCS data, critical reason category is a derived variable. That is, it is derived from the codes in the full 
critical reason variable. The full critical reason variable includes a level for “driver factor, unknown type,” but the 
critical reason category variable does not. It appears that in generating the critical reason category variable, all cases 
coded “driver factor, unknown type” were assigned the “performance” code in the critical reason category variable. 
Accordingly, we corrected this error before comparing the variable with the results from the review of TIFA 
materials. 
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to determine if the reason a driver pulled out at an intersection was because he failed to see 
approaching traffic or he misjudged the gap available. In these instances, the UMTRI team chose 
“driver factor, unknown type,” which accounted for 14.3 percent of all cases in the TIFA review 
and only 4.1 percent of the LTCCS cases. However, if all types of driver factors are summed, 
including the unknown types, the percentage of driver factors is reasonably close. The LTCCS 
coded 25.7 percent of the cases to a driver factor. Excluding the unknowns, the UMTRI team 
coded 26.0 percent. Thus, the overall distributions between the two approaches are quite similar, 
with the caution that the LTCCS produced more detail, and the TIFA review left a larger number 
of cases unknown.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the critical event category from the review of TIFA cases and 
the LTCCS team. Critical event captures the event that immediately precipitated the crash, and is 
coded for all vehicles in the crash, though vehicles that are not involved in the first harmful event 
are all assigned “not in first harmful event,” regardless of how they became involved. The top 
level categories are shown, and, just as in Table 1, there is a column that shows the percentage 
distribution of critical event category calculated after excluding the unknowns. As in the case of 
most of the variables coded in the review, there was a relatively high number of unknowns, in 
part because some police reports could not be obtained, and in part because not enough 
information was available from the TIFA survey to determine the coding.  
Table 2 Critical Event Category as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
UMTRI LTCCS 
Critical event category N % 
% 
excluding 
unknown N % 
This vehicle loss of control 18 7.3 8.1 17 6.9 
This vehicle traveling 30 12.2 13.5 32 13.1 
Other motor vehicle in lane 52 21.2 23.3 57 23.3 
Other motor vehicle encroaching 60 24.5 26.9 64 26.1 
Nonmotorist 14 5.7 6.3 19 7.8 
Object or animal 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.4 
Other 4 1.6 1.8 5 2.0 
Not in first harmful event 45 18.4 20.2 50 20.4 
Unknown 22 9.0 0 0.0 
Total 245 100.0 100.0 245 100.0 
 
Yet it is striking how similar the distribution of critical event category coded in the UMTRI 
review is to critical event coded by the LTCCS team, after adjusting for the unknowns. The 
biggest difference is in the percentage of cases coded “non-motorist,” the category for non-
motorists in or approaching the roadway,  and that is a difference of only 6.3 percent for the 
UMTRI review and 7.8 percent for the LTCCS cases. The percentages for the most common 
critical event categories differ between the two efforts only by trivial amounts. 
 
LTCCS/TIFA Comparison  page 8 
Right of way was also coded by both the LTCCS team and the UMTRI review of TIFA cases. 
There were significant differences in the approach to the variable. In the UMTRI review, right of 
way was coded for every vehicle at the time of the critical event, attempting to apply the legal 
rules of the road. The LTCCS team, however, coded many cases “not applicable,” apparently 
meaning that right of way was not relevant to the crash. How relevance was determined is not 
entirely clear, and the UMTRI team was not confident that it could reproduce the standards 
within the scope of the project. UMTRI instead determined for each vehicle within the context of 
the collision which vehicle had the right of way. This approach follows that used by the UMTRI 
team in the FACT project for the Michigan State Police. In that project, right of way was coded 
for nearly all vehicles, and was validated in ambiguous cases by reviewing with an experienced 
officer of the State Patrol. 
However, the high proportion of “not applicable” coded by the LTCCS prevents valid 
comparisons of the overall distribution of right of way. The LTCCS found right of way not 
applicable in almost half of the cases reviewed here. This is not analogous to the problem of 
missing data, since it is reasonable to assume that there is no bias relevant to the crashes to which 
police reports could not be obtained, while the choice of “not applicable” for right of way flows 
directly from the nature of the crash. Of more interest will be the comparison of coding right of 
way on a case-by-case basis, which directly shows the extent of agreement. This will be 
discussed more specifically below, but here it may be noted that the teams differed in only five 
cases where a specific right of way was assigned. 
Table 3 Right of Way, as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
Review LTCCS 
Right of way N % N % 
This vehicle 157 64.1 106 43.3 
Other vehicle 50 20.4 21 8.6 
Not applicable 9 3.7 117 47.8 
Unknown 29 11.8 1 0.4 
Total 245 100.0 245 100.0 
 
The distributions of crash type category coded by the two efforts is reasonably similar, 
particularly when adjusted for the number of cases for which the UMTRI review could not 
acquire the necessary police report. (Table 4) The LTCCS effort classified a higher proportion of 
cases in the “miscellaneous” category, essentially an “other” category for cases that do not fit 
into any of the other categories. This category also includes the large number of cases in which 
the truck was not involved in the first harmful event. UMTRI identified 47 such cases, and the 
TIFA review included a separate category to identify them, while the LTCCS team included 
them in the “other” category. Note that 28.2 percent of the LTCCS are coded “miscellaneous” 
compared with a combined 19.6 percent of the review cases, combining miscellaneous and not in 
the first harmful event. 
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Table 4 Crash Type Category as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
Review LTCCS 
Crash type category N % 
% 
excluding 
unknown N % 
Single driver 
Right roadside departure 12 4.9 5.3 9 3.7 
Left roadside departure 12 4.9 5.3 14 5.7 
Single vehicle, forward impact 16 6.5 7.1 20 8.2 
Same trafficway, same direction 
Rear-end 45 18.4 20.0 50 20.4 
Sideswipe, same direction 15 6.1 6.7 11 4.5 
Same trafficway, forward impact 2 0.8 0.9 0 0.0 
Same trafficway, opposite direction 
Head-on 23 9.4 10.2 21 8.6 
Sideswipe, opposite direction 14 5.7 6.2 10 4.1 
Same trafficway/opposite direction 2 0.8 0.9 3 1.2 
Change trafficway, vehicle turning 
Turn across path 16 6.5 7.1 12 4.9 
Turn into path 4 1.6 1.8 7 2.9 
Intersection paths, both straight 
Straight paths 16 6.5 7.1 19 7.8 
Miscellaneous 
1 0.4 0.4 69 28.2 Backing, etc.;  
Not in first harmful event 47 19.2 20.9 0 0.0 
Unknown 20 8.2 0 0.0 
Total 245 100.0 100.0 245 100.0 
 
It may be the somewhat paradoxical case that the additional information on crash events 
available to the LTCCS team accounts for the higher percent of “other” cases. The additional 
information resulting from site visits, crash reconstructions, and focused interviews with 
participants and witnesses, may have resulted in more information that made the defined 
categories less suitable. On the other hand, the UMTRI team, working from primarily police 
reports, had a somewhat simpler picture and so, based on the information available, was able to 
assign a specific category. 
Pre-event movement describes the movement of the vehicle prior to the “critical crash envelope,” 
(CCE) essentially prior to the initiation of the crash sequence. Timing considerations can be 
important in defining the boundaries of the CCE. In addition, there can be close calls in trying to 
distinguish between some of the categories. For example, it may be difficult to determine if a 
vehicle is stopped, decelerating, or starting when crashes occur in stop-and-go traffic. The 
UMTRI team also found that some curves depicted in police diagrams were so gradual as make it 
ambiguous whether the truck was negotiating a curve or going straight. The overall distribution 
of pre-event movement from the TIFA review is reasonably close to that of the LTCCS team, as 
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adjusted for missing data, but there are some differences. The TIFA review produced a higher 
percentage of cases “going straight” and a lower proportion of “negotiating a curve.” The 
LTCCS team also found more trucks “stopped” and fewer with a “successful avoidance” 
maneuver to a previous critical event. Differences in the type and amount of resources available 
to the two teams, and genuine uncertainties in making close calls, likely explain the variations. 
Table 5 Pre-event Movement as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
Review LTCCS 
Pre-event movement N % 
% 
excluding 
unknown N % 
No driver 1 0.4 0.5 2 0.8 
Going straight 138 56.3 62.4 141 57.6 
Decelerating 7 2.9 3.2 6 2.4 
Accelerating 0 0.0 0.0 5 2.0 
Starting 4 1.6 1.8 2 0.8 
Stopped 23 9.4 10.4 35 14.3 
Passing 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.4 
Disabled/parked in lane 3 1.2 1.4 1 0.4 
Turning right 3 1.2 1.4 1 0.4 
Turning left 8 3.3 3.6 2 0.8 
U-turn 1 0.4 0.5 0 0.0 
Backing 1 0.4 0.5 2 0.8 
Negotiating curve 21 8.6 9.5 34 13.9 
Changing lanes 0 0.0 0.0 7 2.9 
Merging 3 1.2 1.4 1 0.4 
Successful avoidance 8 3.3 3.6 5 2.0 
Unknown 24 9.8 0 0.0 
Total 245 100.0 100.0 245 100.0 
 
Avoidance maneuver is similarly difficult to code. The variable includes not just the top level 
maneuvers (braking, steering, and accelerating), but also selected combinations of them, and 
whether there was lockup of the brakes as well. Table 6 shows the distribution of avoidance 
maneuver for the two teams, along with the distribution of the TIFA review adjusted for 
unknown cases. Note that the TIFA review team was unable to assign an avoidance maneuver in 
over 30 percent of the cases, compared with less than three percent in LTCCS. The distributions 
from the two teams overall have the same shape, but there are differences in detail. LTCCS 
found no avoidance in about half of the cases, while the review of TIFA materials found no 
avoidance in almost 60 percent. The TIFA team also found that it was difficult to determine if 
there was lockup and skidding in the avoidance maneuver, so the TIFA review resulted in a 
higher proportion of cases coded “braking, unknown lockup,” compared with LTCCS. The 
LTCCS was unable to determine lockup in only one case, compared with eight cases in the TIFA 
review. But remember that the LTCCS investigators were able to visit and photograph the scene, 
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and frequently performed a reconstruction. Overall, both teams had about the same percentage of 
cases with braking as part of the avoidance maneuver. 
Table 6 Avoidance as Coded in UMTRI Review and LTCCS 
Review LTCCS 
Avoidance maneuver N % 
% 
excluding 
unknown N % 
No driver 2 0.8 1.2 2 0.8 
No avoidance 101 41.2 59.1 122 49.8 
Brake, no lockup 2 0.8 1.2 14 5.7 
Brake, lockup 16 6.5 9.4 32 13.1 
Brake, unknown lockup 8 3.3 4.7 1 0.4 
Steer left 5 2.0 2.9 6 2.4 
Steer right 5 2.0 2.9 10 4.1 
Brake & steer left 16 6.5 9.4 10 4.1 
Brake & steer right 15 6.1 8.8 21 8.6 
Accelerate 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.8 
Other action 1 0.4 0.6 18 7.3 
Unknown 74 30.2 7 2.9 
Total 245 100.0 100.0 245 100.0 
 
5.2 Case-level Comparison of Primary Variables 
This section provides results of comparing the coding of the variables on a case-by-case basis. 
The previous section compared the overall distribution of the variables between the two files. A 
case-by-case comparison will show the extent to which the two approaches (review of TIFA 
materials and the LTCCS in-depth investigation) can result in conflicts on specific data items. 
We compare the results where both teams were able to code the variable, i.e., excluding 
unknowns. 
Critical reason category is a central variable in the LTCCS methodology to determine crash 
contribution, and so we will begin with that variable. There were 213 cases that were not 
unknown in both files. Of these, the two teams agreed in 192 cases, or 90.1 percent of the time in 
which both teams had enough information to make an assignment. The level of agreement was 
helped considerably by the large number of cases where critical reason was coded to the other 
vehicle by both teams. Coding the case to the other vehicle does not require all the information to 
identify a specific reason for the vehicle or driver.  
In addition, we also counted all cases in which the UMTRI review team identified a driver-
related reason, but did not have enough information to be more specific (driver factor, unknown 
type) as in agreement with the LTCCS determination if the LTCCS team also chose one of the 
driver factors. The LTCCS team had substantially more information available to make a more 
detailed assessment of the driver error, while the UMTRI review team had access only to police 
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reports, some of which had some detail, including witness statements and crash reconstructions. 
But many simply did not provide sufficient information, in the judgment of the UMTRI team, to 
make a more detailed determination; accordingly, the team coded driver factor, unknown type, in 
those instances. Table 7 shows the percentage of agreement for each critical reason category. In 
the table, it is counted as a conflict if LTCCS shows a recognition factor and the TIFA review 
shows a decision factor, even though both selected a driver critical reason. The breakdown of the 
types of driver reasons somewhat overstates the level of conflict in coding between the UMTRI 
review and the LTCCS team. If all driver reasons are added together, about 77 percent of cases 
in which the UMTRI review assigned the critical reason to a driver category were also assigned a 
driver category by the LTCCS team. 
Table 7 Agreement Between Review and LTCCS 
 Coding of Critical Reason Category 
Critical reason category N 
% 
agreement
Not this vehicle 150 97.3 
Non-performance 4 50.0 
Recognition 7 55.6 
Decision 7 71.4 
Performance 1 0.0 
Driver, unknown type 35 74.3 
Vehicle 7 71.4 
Highway 2 50.0 
 
On right of way, there were 216 cases in which both teams were able to code the variable (i.e., 
did not leave it unknown). Right of way was not in conflict in 97.3 percent of the cases; in five 
cases, right of way was coded in conflicting ways. In four of the conflicts, the LTCCS teams 
coded right of way to the truck and the UMTRI team coded it to the other vehicle, and in the 
other case, LTCCS coded right of way to the other vehicle and UMTRI coded it to the truck. The 
large fraction of cases in which right of way was coded not applicable by the LTCCS 
complicates the comparison, but only somewhat. LTCCS coding rules specified coding not 
applicable when right of way was not deemed relevant in the crash (almost half the cases; see 
Table 3 above), while the UMTRI teamed attempted to code right of way in all instances, only 
using the not applicable code for cases such as single-vehicle road departures not involving any 
other vehicle or road user. However, overall there appears to be good agreement on the coding of 
right of way, with only five instances in which the two teams differed. 
Critical event is another crucial variable in understanding the contributions of different roles and 
conditions in a crash, though it is important to repeat that the critical event is in no sense the 
“cause” of the crash. Rather, the critical event is the event that precipitated the crash. After the 
critical event, the crash or collision was unavoidable. For this comparison, we compare the 
higher level category of the critical event, rather than the more fine-grained subcategories. The 
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critical event categories are the stems for more detailed branches. For example, the “this vehicle 
traveling” stem has ten branches, including over the lane line on the left side of travel, off the 
edge of the road on the left side, turning left at intersection, and so on. The review of the 
materials available in the TIFA survey—primarily the police report—are themselves not 
sufficiently in-depth to expect the review to provide as much detail as the LTCCS study, with its 
much greater resources. However, it is reasonable to compare results at the higher category level, 
which captures the basic structure of the crash and contributes substantially to the overall 
understanding of the crash. Overall, the UMTRI review and the LTCCS team chose the same 
critical event category in 87.4 percent of the 223 cases for which both were able to assign a 
critical event. 
Table 8 shows the number of trucks assigned to the different categories by the review of TIFA 
materials, and the percentage of each with the same category in the LTCCS data. For the most 
common categories, the percentage of agreement is relatively high. Cases coded “Not in the first 
harmful event” by UMTRI had the same code 97.8 percent of the time. “Other motor vehicle 
encroaching” agreed in 91.7 percent. “This vehicle traveling” cases agreed in only about 73.3 
percent, however. And only two-thirds of the cases coded by UMTRI as “loss of control” as the 
precipitating event were coded the same way in LTCCS. It is likely that the supplementary 
investigation, scene examination, and witness interviews included in the LTCCS allowed better 
discrimination as to whether the loss of control led to the crash or was precipitated by avoidance 
maneuvers.  
Table 8 Agreement Between Review and LTCCS 
 Coding of Critical Event Category 
Critical event category N 
% 
agreement 
Loss of control 18 66.7 
This vehicle traveling 30 73.3 
Other motor vehicle in lane 52 86.5 
Other motor vehicle encroaching 60 91.7 
Nonmotorist 14 100.0 
Other 4 75.0 
Not in first harmful event 45 97.8 
 
Comparison of the coding of pre-event movement and crash avoidance maneuver also showed 
somewhat mixed results. For pre-event movement, pre-event movement was not unknown for 
221 cases. The UMTRI review and the LTCCS team selected the same pre-event movement in 
77.8 percent of those cases. The largest number of conflicts were cases in which the review 
coded going straight and the LTCCS team coded negotiating a curve. In both categories, the 
driver could be considered to be primarily engaged in lane-keeping, rather than in an active 
maneuver. And in the UMTRI review, it was noted in a number of cases that the curves depicted 
in the police diagrams were fairly subtle. In other words, in some instances the curves were so 
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gradual that there was disagreement between the coders as to whether the road was essentially 
curved or essentially straight. Eventually, the convention was adopted that if the road was 
detectibly curved it would be coded as curved. There were also some cases in which it was not 
clear whether the vehicle had come to a complete stop or was still just stopping before the 
critical event. Crashes in stop-and-go traffic are particularly problematic. Minor factors such as 
these can result in conflicts in the coding.  
Crash avoidance maneuver also showed a relatively high level of inconsistency between the 
UMTRI review and the LTCCS team. Coding avoidance maneuver was often quite difficult for 
the UMTRI review team. The variable is fairly detailed, including braking, whether the brakes 
locked, steering, direction of steer, and acceleration as avoidance maneuvers, including 
combinations of the maneuvers. For example, a reviewer could code braking with no lockup, 
braking with lockup, steering right, braking and steering right, or some other action. This amount 
of detail is somewhat challenging, given the range of information available on police reports. 
Overall, there were only 167 cases in which both teams assigned an avoidance maneuver. The 
LTCCS team left only seven cases unknown, thanks to the resources available, but the UMTRI 
team had insufficient information to make a determination in 74 cases, only 13 of which were 
explained by the lack of a police report. Of the 167 cases in common, the same avoidance 
maneuver was coded in 62.3 percent of the cases. However, considering only the binary 
classification—was there an avoidance maneuver or not—the two teams agreed in 85 percent of 
the cases. 
5.3 Additional factors 
The TIFA review team also included coding of a set of driver, vehicle, and environmental 
factors. In addition to these items, a catchall item was added after reviewing a few cases: 
insufficient evidence to determine factors. 
Table 9 Additional Factors Coded 
Driver Vehicle Environmental   
Distraction Tire deficiency Roadway 
Aggressive driving Brake problems Vehicle required to stop 
Fatigue Cargo shift  
Felt work pressure from carrier   
Following too close   
Illegal maneuver   
Illness   
Inadequate evasive action   
Inadequate surveillance   
Inattention   
Traveling too fast for conditions   
Unfamiliar with roadway   
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The experience of the team reviewing the TIFA materials was that these items were very difficult 
to identify with confidence. Items such as speeding and roadway condition were mentioned in 
the police reports if the officer felt they affected the crash. Fatigue was mentioned if the nature of 
the crash was consistent with the driver being asleep. But matters related to the carrier (“work 
pressure”) or familiarity with the roadway are seldom mentioned, whether they were present or 
not. It cannot be expected that reporting officers would specifically address those questions, 
unless a driver raised it himself. In a similar way, it was typically not possible to distinguish 
distraction from inattention or surveillance factors, in the narratives and diagrams, unless 
explicitly mentioned, so those factors were rarely checked. Only three cases were coded with 
distraction, six with inattention, seven for inadequate surveillance. Such items are only picked up 
if the crash narrative identifies them as part of the critical reason. In the end, the TIFA review 
team felt there was insufficient evidence to reasonably evaluate the presence of the factors in 
87.4 percent of the cases. 
Analysis of the factors was not pursued further at this time because of the limited time available 
within the scope of the project. 
6 Comparison with Driver and Vehicle Factors Variables in the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System files 
The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) file, annually compiled by the NHTSA is the 
primary file for fatal motor vehicle traffic crashes. The TIFA serves as a supplement to the 
FARS file, in that TIFA identifies medium and heavy trucks in the FARS file and collects 
additional information on the truck, driver, crash, trip, and carrier through a telephone survey. 
All TIFA cases are ultimately found in FARS.  
The FARS file consists of data collected by analysts based in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. These analysts collect a standard set of data about each crash, vehicle, and person 
involved in a traffic accident in which at least one person was fatally injured. The analysts use a 
broad range of documentation to compile the data, including police reports and any investigation 
that enforcement authorities may choose to conduct, coroner’s reports, and administrative data 
such as driver and vehicle registration files. FARS analysts do not do any independent 
investigation of their own, but draw on information that is collected by other entities for their 
own purposes. FARS is the most comprehensive and detailed database for fatal crashes. All the 
LTCCS fatal crashes should also appear in FARS. 
As part of the FARS record, analysts code two sets of variables that are of particular interest 
here. The first is the “driver-related factors” variables. Driver-related factors records driving 
errors and conditions, for each involved driver. Up to four responses can be recorded for each 
driver, allowing the coding of up to four mistakes or conditions that may have contributed to the 
crash. The second set of variables is the analogous “vehicle-related” factors, which records pre-
existing vehicle conditions or failures that are recorded on the police report. Most of the vehicle-
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related codes relate to the mechanical condition of the vehicle, but there are also some that 
identify special conditions that further identify the use of the vehicle. Up to two vehicle-related 
factors may be coded.  
FARS analysts draw up the police report to code driver-related factors. The instruction in the 
coding manual used by the analysts is to “code information provided in the narrative by the 
investigation officer. It is the officer’s assessment.” The same is true for vehicle-related factors. 
Thus, the information in the variables does not record the analysts’ assessments, nor is it truly a 
record of the “presence” of conditions, errors, and so on. Both variables can probably be 
understood as recording the officer’s assessment of factors that contributed to the crash. In that 
way, they probably are closest to the critical reason variable, in terms of identifying items that 
contributed, in the officer’s judgment, to the crash. Though clearly they are in no way substitutes 
for the LTCCS variables. 
Table 10 shows the comparison of the FARS coding of driver-related factors and the assignment 
of the category of critical reason from the review of TIFA materials. For the purposes of this 
table, specific driver-related factors were aggregated to indicate whether a factor was coded or 
not. Overall, driver factors were recorded by FARS in 40.4 percent of the cases reviewed for this 
effort. The percentage columns show the percentage with a driver-related factor for each critical 
reason category. 
Table 10 Comparison of Critical Reason Category and FARS Driver-Related Factors 
Driver-related factor coded 
Yes None Unknown Total 
Critical reason category N %* N % N % N 
Not coded to this vehicle 22 14.7 128 85.3 0 0.0 150 
Non-performance 4 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 
Recognition 8 88.9 1 11.1 0 0.0 9 
Decision 7 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 
Performance 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 
Driver factor, unk. type 32 91.4 2 5.7 1 2.9 35 
Vehicle factor 7 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 
Highway/weather factor 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 
Unknown 16 53.3 12 40.0 2 6.7 30 
Total 99 40.4 143 58.4 3 1.2 245 
*Row percentages for each category of critical reason 
 
In general, there is some relationship between the critical reason and driver factors. In 85.3 
percent of cases in which the TIFA review assigned the critical reason to another vehicle, no 
driver factors were recorded for the truck driver. And in virtually all cases where the critical 
reason category was assigned to a driver factor, at least one driver factor was recorded in FARS. 
But driver factors were also recorded when the critical reason category was assigned to a vehicle 
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failure or highway/weather conditions. The close association between the two variables is 
expected, since both ultimately rely on police reports and both approach driver contribution, 
albeit from quite different perspectives.  
The FARS vehicle-related factors is more problematic, and not only because it is also used to 
record special uses of the vehicle involved. Identifying vehicle conditions that may have 
contributed to a crash is typically very difficult for police officers. Only the most egregious 
problems can usually be detected, such as brake failures or tire blowouts. Short of a catastrophic 
failure, officers do not have the training or responsibility to determine the contribution of 
mechanical factors to crashes. In Table 11, all vehicle factors are aggregated to identify trucks 
with any coded vehicle defects. The “none” category means that no condition was coded, and the 
special column identifies cases where the variable was used to record a special condition (such as 
hit-and-run vehicle or used in highway construction) for the vehicle. One would expect that 
trucks for which the critical reason category was a vehicle factor would also have vehicle-related 
defects recorded in the FARS file. And in fact, that critical reason category had the highest 
percentage of vehicles with a FARS-recorded vehicle defect. However, only 42.9 percent of the 
trucks had a vehicle problem identified in FARS, and an equal percentage had a special vehicle 
item set. Overall, only 5.7 percent of the trucks had a mechanical problem recorded. 
Table 11 Comparison of Critical Reason Category and FARS Vehicle-Related Factors 
Vehicle-related factor coded 
Yes None Special Unk. Total 
Critical reason category N %* N % N % N % N 
Not coded to this vehicle 6 4.0 140 93.3 3 2.0 1 0.7 150 
Non-performance 0 0.0 3 75.0 1 25.0 0 0.0 4 
Recognition 0 0.0 8 88.9 1 11.1 0 0.0 9 
Decision 1 14.3 6 85.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 
Performance 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 
Driver factor, unk. type 1 2.9 31 88.6 0 0.0 3 8.6 35 
Vehicle factor 3 42.9 1 14.3 3 42.9 0 0.0 7 
Highway/weather factor 0 0.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 
Unknown 3 10.0 25 83.3 1 3.3 1 3.3 30 
Total 14 5.7 217 88.6 9 3.7 5 2.0 245 
* Row percentages for each category of critical reason. 
 
7 Summary  
All fatal crashes, as determined by the researcher, were extracted from the LTCCS weighted 
cases, i.e., those occurring after the pilot phase. An effort was made to match the trucks to the 
corresponding records in UMTRI’s TIFA file. The two files do not use the same case identifiers 
so it was necessary to match on other factors. The matching process used variables that identified 
geographical location (state and county), specific day and time of day, and vehicle and driver 
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characteristics, such as vehicle identification number, make, model year, and driver age. A total 
of 261 trucks were subset from the LTCCS data; 245 were matched to TIFA records and the 
other 16 could not be matched. The next phase of the effort focused on the 245 matched cases. 
In the second phase of the work, two experienced crash analysts independently coded a set of the 
variables central to the LTCCS methodology. The variables captured the critical event and 
critical reason for the critical event, pre-crash maneuver and avoidance maneuver, right of way, 
and a selected set of driver, vehicle, and environmental factors. After each reviewer coded every 
case, the results for each variable were compared and any inconsistencies were discussed and 
corrected. Overall, agreement between the two reviewers was good. 
The purpose of the coding effort was to determine if certain LTCCS variables could be 
reasonably captured using materials available in the TIFA project. The LTCCS, of course, was a 
major undertaking with very extensive resources deployed over a number of years to collect 
massive amounts of information about a limited set of truck crashes. Each case had at least one 
researcher and a truck inspector to evaluate the mechanical condition of the truck. Cases were 
reviewed in the field and then forwarded to two central offices to code additional data, using the 
materials collected by the field investigator and truck inspector. Resources for the LTCCS team 
included on-site visits, sometimes on-scene investigation, extensive photography of the vehicles 
and location, interviews with all participants and witnesses, interviews with the motor carrier, 
and access to a number of administrative files to collect driver, vehicle, and company 
information. 
In contrast, the TIFA survey is a telephone survey conducted on all trucks (GVWR greater than 
10,000 pounds) involved in a fatal accident in the United States. Police reports for each crash are 
acquired by UMTRI and used to locate respondents knowledgeable about the vehicle. The survey 
collects information about the configuration and loading of the truck at the time of the crash, the 
type of carrier operating the vehicle, the type of trip, the driver’s time at the wheel prior to the 
crash, and the crash type. The TIFA materials available for this project include primarily the 
police report. In some cases, the police report is fairly extensive and includes crash 
reconstructions and witness statements. Others are fairly cursory, even though the crashes are 
fatal. Unfortunately, the LTCCS sample included two states that declined to supply police 
reports for some years during the years the LTCCS was underway. This is a bit of bad luck, 
because in most years no more than one or two states refuse to supply police reports. This fact 
drove up missing data higher than it would be if all TIFA cases were examined. 
Comparing the results produced by the LTCCS and by the review of TIFA materials gives a 
somewhat mixed picture. There was reasonably good agreement in coding the overall structure 
of the crash itself. In terms of the critical event category, the distribution of TIFA results was 
quite close to that in the LTCCS. At the case level, the codes were in agreement for 86.1 percent 
of the cases where the variable was not unknown. Similarly for the critical reason category 
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variable, the overall distributions were in good agreement (with one exception to be discussed 
shortly), and 90.1 percent of cases were coded the same. 
There was less agreement for more detailed variables. For example, both pre-crash event and 
avoidance maneuver are fairly fine-grained, with only subtle (in the context of a crash) 
differences between code levels in some cases. For example, when the crash took place in stop-
and-go traffic, it was often difficult to determine if the vehicle was stopping, stopped, or starting 
in traffic immediately prior to the initiation of the crash sequence. Similarly, without access to 
more than the police report, it might be possible to determine that the vehicle was braking, but 
not whether lockup occurred. Capturing finer details of crash events and conditions was in many 
instances not feasible from the TIFA materials.  
Agreement was fairly good—remarkably good, in fact, when considering differences in the scale 
of resources devoted—for the critical reason category. But this level of agreement was arrived at 
by essentially lumping all the driver reasons together. Driver reasons fall into four general 
categories: Non-performance, recognition, decision, and performance. Without consistent access 
to witnesses, drivers, other investigators, and the scene, it was very difficult to judge whether the 
crash was produced by a decision or a recognition error. Accordingly, “driver factor, unknown 
type” was selected much more often in the TIFA review than by the LTCCS team. Similarly, the 
two efforts agreed reasonably well on the critical event at the category level, but not at the more 
fine-grained level.  
This was made very clear to the UMTRI reviewers as they struggled to code driver, vehicle, and 
environmental factors. Some were straightforward in some cases. When a vehicle inspection was 
included, it was possible to identify vehicle factors. But unless they played a critical role in the 
crash that was noted by the officer, in most cases it was simply not possible to determine the 
condition of the vehicle. The same was true for the driver factors items. In over 87 percent of the 
cases, the reviewers did not feel there was sufficient information in the police report to determine 
the presence or absence of the factors. 
It is possible to code reliably the basic structure of the crash using materials available in the 
TIFA survey. This includes right of way, critical event category, and critical reason category. 
More detailed information about the crash, such as the full critical event variable or the full 
critical reason variable, is not feasible within the scope of the materials available in the TIFA 
survey. Associated events and factors are not captured on police reports reliably and routinely 
enough to permit them to be coded with confidence that they have been identified when present 
and not identified when absent. The in-depth investigation of the LTCCS is more suited to 
collect the more detailed information about the nature of the crashes. 
